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Abstract
We present a cash-ow based model of corporate debt valuation that incorporates two novel features.
First, we allow for the separation and optimal determination of the rm's debt-service and dividend
policies; in particular, the rm is allowed to maintain cash reserves to meet future debt obligations.
Second, our model admits the possibility that raising resources through issuance of new equity could
be a costly procedure. In contrast, much of the previous literature has considered only dividend
policies that are the \residual" consequences of debt-service policy, and has assumed new equity
issuance costs are either zero or innite.
We provide an analytical characterization of equilibrium behavior in our model. Numerical
analysis of the equilibrium reveals that our model predicts substantially higher yield spreads than
the canonical Merton-type model. More importantly, we nd that the two novel features of our
model are crucial determinants of not only the overall spreads that result but also of the marginal
impact of allowing for debt-service to be strategic. Specically: (a) assuming residual rather than
optimal dividend policies can result in a signicant upward bias in the yield spreads predicted by
the model; (b) the size of this bias depends in a central way on the costs of equity issuance; (c) the
marginal impact of strategic debt-service is substantial, in general, only for low equity-issuance
costs, and (d) under optimally-determined dividends, strategic debt-service can actually result in
a narrowing of yield spreads. In summary, our results indicate that endogenizing dividend policy
and allowing for equity-issuance costs can enhance the model's content substantially, while ignoring
these factors could introduce non-trivial biases into the valuation.
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1 Introduction
An extensive literature in nance has built on Merton's [32] model for the valuation of corporate
debt that is subject to the risk of default. Merton's original framework considers a rm with equity
and zero-coupon debt as claims, and prices these claims under an exogeneously given process for the
value of the rm's assets. The paper makes some simplifying assumptions. Intermediate cash ows
are not modelled. It is assumed that liquidation of the rm is costless. It is further assumed that the
absolute priority rule (APR) is strictly observed in the event of default, i.e., bondholders are paid
in full before equityholders get anything. These simplications are analytically advantageous, but
they come at a steep cost: most importantly, the model generates yield spreads that are too small
in relation to observed levels. Motivated by this discrepancy, subsequent research has generalized
the Merton model in many ways; a review of the literature may be found in Section 2.
In a pair of striking recent papers, Anderson and Sundaresan [3] and Mella-Barral and Per-
raudin [30] propose models that extend Merton's framework in two important directions. First, the
papers explicitly introduce periodic cash ows as the source of rm value and as the driving force
behind the rm value process. This enables drawing a distinction between default and liquidation.
Second, both papers allow for strategic debt-service, i.e., for equityholders to underperform on their
debt-service obligations (even when there is suÆcient cash available to meet these obligations) if
this underperformance enhances equity value.
1
Thus, in addition to \liquidity defaults"|which
arise when there is insuÆcient cash to meet debt service obligations|\strategic defaults" are also
now possible in the model; this enables endogeneization of equilibrium departures from the APR.
It is shown that in the presence of liquidation costs, these richer specications lead to equilib-
rium spreads that are substantially wider than in the original Merton [32] model and are closer to
observed levels.
Despite these appealing features, the papers make two assumptions that warrant closer scrutiny.
First, both papers require that all cash ows generated by the rm in each period be paid out
completely to claimholders; thus, any residual cash left after debt service is necessarily paid out
as dividends to equityholders. (We shall call this a residual dividend policy). Under such a policy,
rms may not maintain cash reserves to meet future debt-service obligations. Second, with regard
to the possibility of raising cash via issue of new equity, the papers make assumptions at opposite
ends of the spectrum. Anderson and Sundaresan eectively assume this process is innitely costly:
new equity issuance in their model is prohibited altogether. At the other end, Mella-Barral and
Perraudin take this process to be costless.
Neither assumption is completely satisfactory. Regarding the rst, intuition suggests that it is
important to allow for a separation of debt-service and dividend policies and for optimal determi-
nation of the latter rather than to assume that all residual cash is paid out as dividends. Casual
and formal empirical evidence also support such separation; for example, Kalay [23] nds that
rms do not pay equityholders the maximum amount of dividends they are allowed to given the
1
The modelling of the default event and the the interaction of the dierent parties in bankruptcy has, of course,
been a focus of corporate nance at least since Jensen and Meckling [21] and Myers [33]. Strategic debt service
attempts to incorporate these considerations in a valuation setting.
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debt covenants they face. Concerning the second restriction, while it may be extreme to assume
that new equity issuance is innitely costly, it appears equally questionable to assume it is costless.
Empirical documentation suggests that such costs are, in fact, substantial;
2
ignoring them would
tend to delay liquidation and bias the value of equity upwards. Moreover, it is inconsistent to
assume that the liquidation of assets is costly but the issue of new equity is not.
In this paper, we propose a generalization of these models that addresses these issues. First,
our model does not require that the cash ow generated in each period be paid out in full to the
claimholders. Rather, in addition to being used for debt-service and payment of dividends, we
allow cash to simply be retained as reserves within the rm. Debt-service and dividend policies
are set strategically and optimally. Second, our model admits the possibility that the issue of new
equity could be costly. The rm chooses optimally the amount of equity to be issued given these
costs. Finally, we retain the features of the earlier models that liquidation is costly and strategic
debt-service is allowed. Thus, our paper combines ve key aspects of the debt valuation problem:
1. The driving stochastic process is the cash ow from operations, not rm value itself.
2. The cash ow within each period can be used for debt service or dividend payments, or it
can retained within the rm to create a cash reservoir for future payments.
3. Liquidation of assets is costly.
4. Additional resources can be raised by issuing new equity, but possibly at a cost.
5. Strategic underperformance of debt-service obligations by equityholders is permitted.
While subsets of these elements have been incorporated into previous models in the literature,
our paper is the rst to combine all ve into a common framework, and, especially, to characterize
optimal dividend and debt-service policies in the presence of costly new equity. This contribution
is not just of theoretical interest: we show that the empirical implications of our model depend on
the interaction between these features, with the two new ones playing an especially important role.
Our main ndings may be summarized as follows:
1. Our model predicts yield spreads that are generally substantially wider than an analog of the
Merton model in our setting. Over a range of parametrizations, the dierence in spreads is
at least 125 basis points, and typically over twice that gure.
2. Assuming dividends are determined residually, rather than optimally, can bias yield spreads
predicted by the model upwards by as much as 200 basis points or more. Intuitively, retained
earnings under optimal dividends create a cushion that can substantially reduce the risk of
the debt.
2
For example, a study of equity issue in the US during the period 1990{94 by Lee, et al [25] considers the direct and
indirect costs of raising new equity including underwriting costs and spreads, issue expenses, and the underpricing of
the issue. They estimate that the direct costs average about 11% for initial public oerings and about 7% for seasoned
equity oerings. It is safe to assume that the total costs of raising equity are substantial even for large corporations.
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3. The actual size of the bias depends critically on the cost of issuing new equity:
(a) When the cost of new equity issuance is small, typically so too is the dierence between
the models. Intuitively, any cash shortfall may be made up by issuing new equity.
(b) When the cost is large, this alternative to retaining cash becomes expensive and often
unprotable, creating a signicant gap between the predictions of the two models.
4. The marginal importance of allowing for debt service to be strategic depends in an essential
way on both the cost of equity issuance and the dividend policy in place.
(a) Strategic debt service plays a signicant role in determining overall spreads when the cost
of issuing new equity is low, but at high costs its marginal impact is much diminished
and often negligible.
(b) The direction of this impact depends on the dividend policy in place. Under a residual
dividend policy, strategic debt service has a clearcut widening eect on spreads. However,
under an optimal dividend policy, strategic debt service widens spreads when equity-
issuance costs are low, but could narrow them as these costs become high.
To summarize, these results indicate that endogeneizing the rm's dividend policy and allowing for
equity-issuance costs can enhance the model's content substantially, while ignoring these factors
could introduce non-trivial biases into the valuation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature and relates
our model to previous work in the area. Section 3 describes our model and the game between
debtholders and equityholders. Section 4 describes the structure of equilibrium in this model,
while Section 5 provides an analytical characterization of optimal dividend policies for the case
of zero-coupon debt. Section 6 specializes these results to a setting where the cash ows evolve
according to a binomial process; this is the setting used by Anderson and Sundaresan [3] and
is the discrete-time equivalent of the geometric Brownian motion assumption used in virtually
all continuous-time models in this eld. In this setting, we compute spreads under residual and
optimal dividend policies and compare the results. Continuing this analysis, Section 7 compares
spreads with and without strategic debt-service, while Section 8 compares our model to an analog
of Merton's [32] model in our setting. Section 9 discusses the case of coupon debt. Section 10
concludes. All proofs omitted in the main body of the text may be found in the appendices.
2 Related Literature
The options characterization of corporate liabilities was rst proposed by Black and Scholes [8]
in their classic paper and elaborated upon by Merton [32]. The Merton framework posits a value
process for a rm with no intermediate cash ows, and takes equity and zero-coupon debt as claims.
In this setting, equity can be viewed as a simple European call option on the value of the rm, since
default on the debt can occur only at maturity. Other salient features of Merton's model include
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the absence of liquidation costs, and the strict observance of the absolute priority rule (APR) in
the event of default (i.e., bondholders are paid in full before equityholders get anything).
Although the Merton model and its extensions such as Black and Cox [7], Geske [17], and Ho
and Singer [19] are innovative in their characterization of risky corporate debt, they fall short of
empirical validity. Several studies (e.g., Jones, et al [22]) have shown that yield spreads implied
by Merton-type models are signicantly lower than those observed in the market. Furthermore,
violations of the APR and strategic renegotiation of debt contracts are widely observed in practice,
contrary to the assumptions of the Merton model.
3
In recent years, Merton's framework has been modied in several ways to make it more realistic
and to bring its predictions in line with empirical evidence.
4
Among these are (i) the introduction of
intermediate or periodic cash ows as the source of rm value, which enables a distinction between
default and liquidation, (ii) admitting costs of liquidation, (iii) allowing for renegotiation of contract
terms between equity and debtholders, and (iv) modelling the violation of the APR, mainly as a
consequence of renegotiation in the event of default. Several papers have examined a combination of
the second and fourth features. Work by Leland [26] and Leland and Toft [27], among others, falls
into this category. These models consider a stationary debt structure that allows for closed-form
solutions and rich comparative statics. Other papers in this genre include Cooper and Mello [9],
Longsta [28], Longsta and Schwartz [29], Kim, et al [24], Mello and Parson [31], and Nielsen,
Saa-Requejo and Santa-Clara [34].
The possibility of renegotiation of debt contracts was introduced in Hart and Moore [18]. A
central insight in their paper is that the existence of liquidation costs provides a motivation for
equityholders to extract rents from the bondholders in the event of default. This feature was
rst integrated into a valuation setting by Anderson and Sundaresan [3] who used an extensive-
form game-theoretic generalization of the Merton framework to analyze the interaction between
equityholders and debtholders. Anderson, et al [4], Mella-Barral and Perraudin [30], and Pan [35]
also develop similar ideas in the context of a perpetual bond. Huang [20] extends Anderson and
Sundaresan to allow for costly equity nancing.
In a recent paper, Fan and Sundaresan [14] analyze a model that addresses several of the issues
raised in this paper. In particular, they also take the cash ow process as primitive, allow for costly
liquidation, and assume that dividend and debt-service policies are set strategically and optimally.
However, there are several important dierences between their model and ours. First, although
they consider external equity nance, their model does not consider the cost of raising resources in
this manner. As a result, they do not consider the trade-o between using this costly alternative
to avoid liquidation on the one hand, and incurring liquidation costs on the other; nor do they
examine the impact of equity-issuance costs on optimal dividend policies. Second, they assume
that retained cash is reinvested in the rm, changing the scale of the rm (more precisely, they pre-
suppose a constant-returns-to-scale technology). Their model does not allow the rm to retain the
3
See, for example, Alderson and Betker [1], Altman [2], Betker [5], Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt [13], Franks
and Torous [15],[16], Warner [38], and Weiss [39].
4
A second branch of the literature takes a \reduced-form" approach to pricing credit risk, and directly posits the
stochastic process of default. See, e.g., Das and Sundaram [10] or DuÆe and Singleton [12].
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cash as reserves. This enables them to avoid the complications that come with path-dependence,
since the current cash ow continues to act as an adequate description of the state of the world at
any point. In contrast, our model presumes the scale of the rm is xed; and that retained cash is
held in a \reservoir" to make future payments to claimholders. Our approach is more in the spirit
of Kalay [23] and Hart and Moore [18] who each argue, in dierent contexts, that it is optimal for
the rm to maintain such reserves of cash.
In summary, several papers have considered cash ow-based models explicitly. Some of them
have explored the consequences of the liquidation costs associated with the rm's assets and the
strategic renegotiation between bondholders and equity holders. However, although the possibility
of raising new equity has been considered in some papers, the cost of doing so has been ignored. In
addition, the possibility of retaining cash within the rm in a reserve to meet future payments has
also not been considered. This gap in the literature has important consequences. On the one hand,
it leads to an unrealistic and asymmetric treatment of the rm which incurs costs of raising cash
by liquidation, but not of raising equity. Thus, the models predict less liquidation than when such
costs are incorporated, leading to an understatement of the risk-premium. However, countering
this, the inability to maintain cash reserves increases the likelihood of forced liquidation, and,
ceteris paribus, raises risk-premia. The overall direction of the bias cannot be predicted in general.
Our paper develops a model in which these trade-os can be considered and biases estimated for
specic parametrizations. We turn now to a description of this model.
3 The Model
We consider a discrete-time setting with time periods indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; : : : The riskless rate of
interest per period is denoted  and is taken to be a constant. It is also assumed that markets are
free of arbitrage, so there exists an equivalent martingale measure Q with respect to the riskless
rate . All stochastic processes and expectations dened in the sequel are with respect to Q.
At the center of our model is a group of homogeneous \equityholders" who have access to a
project that will generate cash ows f
e
f
t
g into the indenite future. At this stage, we place no
restrictions on the structure of the cash ow process; in particular, it could be a binomial process
as in Anderson and Sundaresan [3]. The present value, viewed from time{t, of all current and
future cash ows is denoted by by V
t
. Letting  = (1 + )
 1
, we have
V
t
= f
t
+  E
t
[V
t+1
]: (3.1)
The project is partly nanced by debt raised from a single homogeneous group of creditors. The
debt contract has maturity T and calls for the payment of an amount c
t
in each period t upto T .
The contract also provides for a contingent transfer of control rights or \liquidation" in the event
that contractual obligations are not met in any period; this is at the option of the debtholders.
Liquidation may not, however, be a costless process. We will denote by L the cost of liquidating
the rm. L may depend on the value A of the rm's assets at that point; we will assume, without
loss of generality, that L(A)  A.
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A central innovation in our paper concerns the treatment of cash ows. It is typical in the
literature (see, e.g., Anderson and Sundaresan [3] or Mella-Barral and Perraudin [30]) to assume
that at each t, any residual amount remaining from the cash ow f
t
after meeting debt service
must be paid out as dividends to the equityholders (we shall call this a residual dividend policy).
In particular, the rm is not allowed to retain cash to meet future debt-service obligations. Our
paper allows for a separation of debt-service and dividend policies. We assume that in each period
t, any cash left over after debt-service may be divided in any desired way between dividends paid
to equityholders and cash retained by the rm as reserves. Retained cash is taken to be invested
at the riskless rate . Equityholders in our model choose the allocation of cash between its three
uses|debt-service, dividends, and retained cash|optimally to maximize the value of equity.
Our model also allows equityholders to raise additional cash in any period through the issue of
new equity. In contrast to much of the existing literature, however, we admit the possibility that
this may be a costly procedure. Specically, we assume that if the rm issues an amount e of new
equity at any point, it incurs a cost of m(e)  0, where m() is a non-decreasing function; thus, the
net amount of cash raised is e m(e). This structure nests as special cases the settings of Leland [26]
and Mella-Barral and Perraudin [30] where new equity issue is assumed costless (m() = 0); and
Anderson and Sundaresan [3] where new equity issuance is taken to be prohibitively expensive
(m(e) = e).
The Subgame at t
We formalize all this by describing the subgame originating at t, t  T . Let 
t
denote the cash
reserves entering period t, and let f
t
be the realized cash ow in period t. Taking into account
this total cash availability of 
t
+ f
t
, and the amount c
t
due on the debt in period t, equityholders
rst select a debt service amount 
t
. If the oer 
t
meets the contractual obligation c
t
, then
debtholders must accept the oered amount. However, if 
t
< c
t
, the rm is technically in default
and debtholders have the option of liquidating the rm. We discuss each of these possibilities and
their consequences in greater detail below.
First, consider the case where 
t
< c
t
and the debtholders reject the oer. In this event, the rm
is liquidated. Its post-liquidation value is given by the value V
t
+
t
of its assets less the liquidation
cost L
t
. (Note that the rm's time{t asset value has two components: V
t
which denotes the value
of current and future periodic cash ows and 
t
, which denotes the cash reserves entering period
t.) Let D
L
t
denote the amount recovered by the debtholders out of this post-liquidation value. D
L
t
may represent the whole or only a fraction of the face value of the total claims of the debtholders;
the imperatives that go into the determination of D
L
t
are discussed below. As residual claimants,
equityholders then receive any remaining portion of the post-liquidation value. Thus, the value of
equity in liquidation is:
[V
t
+ 
t
]  L
t
 D
L
t
: (3.2)
Alternatively, suppose debtholders accept the oer 
t
. Two possibilities now arise. In the rst,
the available cash 
t
+ f
t
exceeds 
t
. In this case, the proposed debt-service is made from available
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cash. The equityholders then decide (i) how much equity e
t
(if any) is to be raised in period t, and
(ii) the level of dividend service Æ
t
. The issue of equity e
t
leaves the rm with a net cash holding
(after debt-service) of 
t
+ f
t
  
t
+ e
t
 m(e
t
). Thus, given the proposed dividend amount Æ
t
, the
retained cash in the rm at time t+ 1 is now

t+1
= (1 + )[
t
+ f
t
+ e
t
 m(e
t
)  
t
  Æ
t
]: (3.3)
The nal remaining possibility is that the oer 
t
is accepted by the debtholders, but the cash
holdings of the rm f
t
+ 
t
are insuÆcient to meet this oer. In this case, the rm must raise
suÆcient cash via issue of new equity to meet this dierence. Taking into account the cost m() of
raising new equity, this means the amount raised e
t
must satisfy

t
+ f
t
+ e
t
 m(e
t
)  
t
: (3.4)
If the rm is successful in raising the required equity, it makes the promised debt-service 
t
, and
then decides on a dividend amount Æ
t
from the remaining cash. Given these choices, the size of
the cash reservoir entering period t + 1 obtains as in (3.3). However, if the rm is not successful
in raising the required equity, liquidation results with debtholders receiving D
L
t
and equityholders
receiving the residual amount (3.2).
Debt and Equity Values in Liquidation
The amount D
L
t
received by debtholders in liquidation depends, in general, on a number of factors
including (i) the value of the rm's assets at default time; (ii) the costs of liquidation; (iii) the debt
structure under consideration; and (iv) the de facto treatment of the various parties in liquidation.
Of these, the modeling of (iii) and|especially|(iv) is non-trivial.
With regard to (iii), the maximum claim of the debtholders in liquidation is, in practice, de-
pendent on the specic debt structure in question as well as on the laws governing default and
bankruptcy. For coupon debt, this maximum is often set equal to the sum of the current coupon
and the face value of the debt; with zero-coupon debt, the maximum claim is typically set equal to
the face value of the debt adjusted for the time left to maturity.
Whether this maximum is actually received by the debtholders (even when there is enough post-
liquidation value to do so) depends on the liquidation process itself. Under the Absolute Priority
Rule (APR), debtholders are given rst claim on the post-liquidation value of the rm; thus, if C
t
denotes their maximum claim, they are entitled to receive
D
L
t
(APR) = minfC
t
; V
t
+ 
t
+ e
t
 m(e
t
)  L
t
g: (3.5)
It is customary in the literature to take liquidation payos as determined by the APR. For two
reasons, we adopt a more exible posture in this regard. First, it is well known that the APR is
often violated in practice, so taking D
L
t
to be given by (3.5) may result in an overvaluation of debt.
Second, the precise formulation of D
L
t
turns out to be unimportant for the theoretical analysis in
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this paper; it plays a role only where we attempt to quantify the spreads generated by our model.
Thus, at this stage, we assume simply that D
L
t
is an arbitrarily specied quantity lying between
the natural admissible limits of zero and the post-liquidation value of the rm's assets:
0  D
L
t
 V
t
+ 
t
+ e
t
 m(e
t
)  L
t
:
At a later point, where we perform numerical comparisons of the spreads generated by our model
with those obtained from others, we will follow much of the literature and assume that the APR
holds, so that D
L
t
is given by (3.5).
5
Equilibrium
The behavior of equityholders and debtholders is taken to be motivated solely by self-interest. The
structure of the game and its parameters are all taken to be common knowledge. Equityholders
choose debt-service and dividend policies to maximize the value of equity given debtholder be-
havior. Debtholders choose acceptance and rejection policies (that apply when oers fall short of
contractual obligations) taking as given the equityholders' debt-service and dividend policies. A
characterization of equilibrium behavior and analysis of equilibrium debt and equity values is the
subject of the remainder of this paper.
4 The Structure of Equilibrium
The structure described above is an extensive-form game of perfect information. Subgame-perfect
equilibria may be identied by backwards induction in the usual manner begining with the maturity
date of the debt contract. We describe the general process here.
Equilibrium in Period T
Suppose the maturity period T has been reached and the rm's performance on its debt-service
obligations has not provoked liquidation thus far. At T , given the cash reserves 
T
, the period{T
cash ow f
T
, and the amount due on the debt c
T
, the equityholders select a debt service amount 
T
.
If 
T
 c
T
, the debtholders accept payment and the game eectively ends, since the rm becomes
an all-equity rm. However, if 
T
< c
T
, the debtholders must decide whether to accept it (and
receive 
T
) or force liquidation of the rm (and receive the liquidation payo D
L
T
). It is immediate
that the oer 
T
will be accepted if and only if

T
 D
L
T
: (4.1)
Expression (4.1) implies that the less debtholders expect to receive in liquidation, the more willing
they will be to accept underperformance of debt-service obligations.
5
A superior alternative might be to take D
L
t
to be some fraction  2 [0; 1] of (3.5) with  signifying the relative
powers of the two parties in liquidation. The precise modeling of liquidation payos is, however, peripheral to the
purposes of this paper; thus, we stick to the APR formulation.
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Now, conditional on making an acceptable oer, it is in equityholders' interest to make the
smallest acceptable oer, which is D
L
t
. This gives rise to two possibilities: (i) the available cash

T
+ f
T
suÆces for this purpose; (ii) the available cash is insuÆcient.
In case (i), it is clearly optimal for equityholders to make the oer 
T
= D
L
T
and for debtholders
to accept. Thus, the time{T value of debt (denoted V
D
T
) is the liquidation value D
L
T
; and the
time{T value of equity (denoted V
E
T
) is the residual value of the rm's assets:
V
D
T
= D
L
T
V
E
T
= V
T
+ 
T
 D
L
T
(4.2)
In case (ii), since the available cash 
T
+ f
T
is less than D
L
T
, the dierence D
L
T
  
T
  f
T
must be raised via issue of new equity if liquidation is to be avoided. However, raising new equity
could itself be a costly process, so this may not be a protable choice for equityholders seeking to
maximize the value of their equity. Specically, let e
min
T
denote the minimum amount of cash that
must be raised in the form of new equity if liquidation is to be avoided:
e
min
T
= minfe  0 j 
T
+ f
T
+ e m(e)  D
L
T
g: (4.3)
Intuition suggests it is optimal for the equityholders to issue this new equity only if the costs
m(e
min
T
) of doing so are less than the liquidation costs L
T
that would be incurred otherwise. We
show this to be true:
Proposition 4.1 Suppose f
T
+
T
< D
L
T
. If m(e
min
T
)  L
T
, it is optimal for equityholders to avoid
liquidation by raising new equity. The time{T values of debt and equity are
V
D
T
= D
L
T
V
E
T
= V
T
+ 
T
 D
L
T
 m(e
min
T
)
(4.4)
If m(e
min
T
) > L
T
, then it is optimal for equityholders to have the rm liquidated, and we have
V
D
T
= D
L
T
V
E
T
= V
T
+ 
T
 D
L
T
  L
T
(4.5)
Proof Suppose the equityholders raise a level of equity e
T
 e
min
T
. Then, the cash available to the
rm is 
T
+ f
T
+ e
T
 m(e
T
). Net of debt-service D
L
T
, therefore, the value of the rm's assets is
V
T
+ 
T
+ e
T
 m(e
T
) D
L
T
. Of this quantity, e
T
represents the value of the new equity raised in
period T , so the value of the \existing" equity is simply
V
T
+ 
T
 m(e
T
) D
L
T
: (4.6)
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Since m() is a monotone increasing function, it is apparent from (4.6) that conditional on raising
enough new equity to avoid liquidation, the value of existing equity is maximized by raising the
minimum required amount e
min
T
, so that existing equity has the time{T value
V
T
+ 
T
 m(e
min
T
) D
L
T
: (4.7)
On the other hand, if the equityholders opt not to raise new equity, liquidation results and the
value of equity in liquidation is simply
V
T
+ 
T
  L
T
 D
L
T
: (4.8)
A comparison of (4.6) and (4.8) establishes the required result. 
Remark: The Importance of an Optimal Dividend Policy
The importance of allowing for dividend policy to be optimally determined, rather than as the
residual consequence of debt-service policy, can be illustrated using the time{T payos derived
above. For sharpness in exposition, we focus on the case where new equity is prohibitively costly to
issue. In this case, depending on the cash available entering period T , payos are given by either
(4.2) or (4.5). The discussion easily extends to the general case of costly equity.
A comparison of (4.2) and(4.5) reveals that time{T equity value V
E
T
has a discontinuity at the
point where 
T
+ f
T
= D
L
T
. This discontinuity provides a fundamental motivation for retaining
cash in the rm rather than paying it out as dividends. Specically, note from (4.2) and (4.5) that,
except at the point of discontinuity, V
E
T
has a slope of at most +1 in 
T
; in words, retaining an
extra dollar in the rm today results, in present value terms, in a gain in equity value of at most
a dollar tommorow. At the point of discontinuity, however, the value of equity registers a jump
increase of L
T
, representing liquidation cost \savings" from having enough cash to meet minimum
debt-service requirements. Thus, a policy of retaining more cash in the rm at time T   1 as
reserves may be worthwhile if it avoids liquidation in a suÆciently high-probability state.
Allowing for an optimal dividend policy enables equityholders to take advantage of this dis-
continuity. Ipso facto, it also reduces the probability of liquidation in equilibrium compared to a
residual dividend policy. Indeed, it is not hard to see that the only situations in which it is optimal
to pay out all surplus cash as dividends in period T 1 are where either (i) there are no liquidation
costs (L
T
 0), or (ii) there is no cost of raising new equity (m()  0).
6
6
In the former case, there are no benets to carrying reserves (since there are no liquidation charges to be avoided)
but there could be an important cost: if a liquidation state is reached, debtholders have rst claim on the rm's assets
including the reserves. In the latter case, the absence of equity-issuance costs enables equityholders to raise exactly
the amount of money required in a given state to avoid liquidation in that state provided it is protable to do so. In
contrast, since reserves are chosen ex-ante, they have the disadvantage that there may be \too much" cash ex-post:
if a state is reached where is is optimal to liquidate the rm, debtholders will have rst claim on these reserves.
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Equilibrium in Period T 1
We return to the description of equilibrium. Consider period T 1, and let 
T 1
and f
T 1
denote,
respectively, the cash reserves at the begining of (T 1) and the realized cash ow in (T 1). Let

T 1
denote the debt-service oered by the equityholders. If 
T 1
meets the amount c
T 1
due on
the debt, the oer is necessarily accepted; if not, it may be rejected at the debtholders' option.
If the oer is rejected, the rm is liquidated and the debt and equity values resolve as
V
D
T 1
= D
L
T 1
V
E
T 1
= V
T 1
+ 
T 1
 D
L
T 1
  L
T 1
(4.9)
If the oer is accepted, equityholders must then decide on (i) how much cash e
T 1
is to be raised
through the issue of new equity, and (ii) the dividend payout Æ
T 1
in period T  1. In particular, in
the event that the initial available cash 
T 1
+f
T 1
is insuÆcient to meet the proposed debt-service
payment of 
T 1
, the new equity issue must at least satisfy

T 1
+ f
T 1
+ e
T 1
 m(e
T 1
)  
T 1
:
If the rm is unable to raise enough cash to meet the promised payment, then liquidation results
and the parties receive the payos (4.9). Otherwise, the proposed payments are made, and debt
and equity values are realized as
V
D
T
= 
T 1
+  E
T 1
[V
D
T
]
V
E
T
= Æ
T 1
+  E
T 1
[V
E
T
]
(4.10)
where E
T 1
[] denotes expectation (under Q) of time{T values conditional on all information at
the end of period T   1, including the choices of 
T 1
, Æ
T 1
, and e
T 1
.
From (4.9) and (4.10), it is optimal for debtholders to accept the oer 
T 1
if and only if the
debt value from continuation (4.10) exceeds that from liquidation (4.9). Taking this into account,
equityholders pick a debt-service oer, and values for new equity issuance and dividend payout, to
maximize the time T   1 value of existing equity.
Remark: The Interdependence of Debt-Service and Dividend Policies
A comparison of (4.9) and (4.10) reveals the intuitively appealing point that the equilibrium ac-
ceptance policy depends on the dividend policy adopted by the equityholders. Specically, the
expectation of continuation debt value in (4.10) depends on the anticipated dividend policy of the
equityholders: ceteris paribus, a higher current dividend payout lowers retained cash holdings en-
tering period T , and thereby lowers continuation debt values. This makes liquidation relatively
more attractive. Put dierently, this means strategic underperformance of debt (
T 1
< c
T 1
)
must be combined with a \low" dividend policy to make it acceptable to debtholders. From a
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modelling standpoint, this observation further underlines the need to separate dividend and debt-
service policies. It is also in line with dividend covenants observed in practice (see, e.g., Smith
and Warner [36]). Indeed, since the rm's dividend policy in our model is chosen subsequent to
debt-service, the only way for the equityholders to credibly commit to a low level of dividends is
precisely through the use of binding restrictions on dividend policy in the debt contract.
Equilibrium in Periods t < T 1
Equilibrium in earlier periods obtains in exactly the same way as in period T  1 using an induction
argument. This completes the description of the game's equilibrium. 
5 Zero{Coupon Debt
A special structure of particular interest is zero-coupon debt, which involves only a single lump-sum
payment at maturity T :
c
t
=
(
0; t < T
c; t = T
(5.1)
The valuation of risky zero-coupon debt has been the focus of a number of papers begining with
Merton [32]. In this section, we examine the implications of our model for this debt structure. In
Section 5.1, we present an analytic characterization of the optimal dividend policy that results.
Using this characterization, we examine, in Section 5.2, the qualitative direction of the biases
that result when dividend policies are not chosen optimally, but are rather determined as residual
consequences of debt-service policies. To complete the analysis, in Section 6, we give quantitative
expression to these biases, by comparing the spreads generated by our model to those obtaining
from residual dividend policies for a range of parameterizations of the model.
5.1 The Structure of Equilibrium with Zero-Coupon Debt
As is evident from the description in Section 4, equilibrium behavior in our model could, in general,
be analytically quite complex. It is interesting, therefore, that under zero-coupon debt the optimal
dividend policy upto period T   2 is easily described:
Proposition 5.1 If debt has the zero-coupon form (5.1), then it is an optimal dividend policy to
pay no dividends upto and including period T   2.
Proof See Appendix B.1. 
Proposition 5.1, which is of particular use from a computational standpoint, re-emphasizes the
importance of allowing for an optimal dividend policy. A simple intuitive argument underlies the
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result. Giving up a dollar of dividends in any period t  T   2 entails no present-value loss to
equity holders if the dollar (plus interest at the rate ) will be returned as dividends in period T 1.
Now, the only circumstance in which equityholders will choose to not pay out all accumulated cash
as dividends in period T   1 is where equity value can be enhanced by retaining some cash in the
rm because it helps avoid a costly cash shortfall in period T . Thus, the zero-dividend policy either
leaves investors no worse o (if all accumulated cash is paid out in period T   1) or strictly better
o (if the retained cash helps prevent costly liquidation or raising of new equity). Proposition 5.1
follows.
A natural question arising from Proposition 5.1 is: what is the optimal dividend policy in period
T  1? In general, the answer will depend on the structure of the problem in question (the cash
ow process, liquidation costs, etc). In two cases of interest, however, a precise answer may be
provided. Suppose that either there are no liquidation costs, or there are no equity-issuance costs.
In either of these situations, it is optimal to pay out the entire cash reserves as dividends in period
T 1. (This was noted above in Section 4; see footnote 6 and the remarks leading to it.) Intuitively,
in either case there is no gain to be made by equityholders in carrying cash from T 1 to T , but
there is a possible loss: if liquidation occurs at T , debtholders have rst claim on the rm's assets
including the cash reserves. We summarize this as a proposition:
Proposition 5.2 Suppose either (a) there are no liquidation costs, or (b) equity may be raised
costlessly. Then, it is an optimal policy to pay out as dividends in period T   1 all cash reserves
available with the rm.
Combining Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 now provides us with the following corollary:
Corollary 5.3 Suppose either (a) there are no liquidation costs, or (b) equity may be raised cost-
lessly. Then, residual dividend policies are fully optimal; that is, it is an optimal policy to pay out
all cash ows as dividends in each period upto and including T   1.
Proof From Proposition 5.1, it is always optimal to pay no dividends up to and including period
T   2, and to simply retain all cash ows up to that point as reserves. On the other hand, from
Proposition 5.2, it is optimal, in the two situations identied in the statement of the corollary, to
carry forward zero reserves from period T   1 to period T , i.e., to pay out the entire cash reserves
as dividends in period T   1. From a present value standpoint, retaining all cash ows in the rm
upto period T   1 and paying them out as dividends at that point is equivalent to paying out all
cash ows as dividends as they occur. 
Remark Corollary 5.3 hides an important asymmetry between liquidation costs and equity-
issuance costs. It is, in fact, true (and becomes apparent on a little reection), that if equity{
issuance costs are zero, then|regardless of the liquidation cost structure or the specic debt struc-
ture in question|\residual dividend policies" are optimal; that is, it is optimal to pay out as
dividends any cash left over after debt service at every point in time. However, under coupon
debt, residual dividend policies may be strictly suboptimal even when liquidation is costless, if
equity-issuance costs are high. See Example C.1 in Section 9. 
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5.2 The Valuation Impact of Optimal Dividend Policies
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that assuming a residual dividend policy would result
in a mis-estimation of the values of debt and equity in the model. The following result elaborates
on this point. The terms \higher" and \lower" in its statement are to be taken as referring to the
corresponding weak inequalities  and .
Proposition 5.4 Let debt have the zero-coupon structure (5.1).
1. Suppose there are either (a) no liquidation costs, or (b) no costs of raising equity. Then,
equity and debt values are the same under optimal and residual dividend policies.
2. Suppose liquidation costs are strictly positive and issuing new equity is costly. Then, the
values of debt and equity under an optimal dividend policy are higher than under a residual
dividend policy. In particular, the equilibrium spreads on debt are lower in the presence of an
optimal dividend policy.
Proof See Appendix B.2. 
Part 1 of Proposition 5.4 follows from Corollary 5.3. To see Part 2, note that equity values will
obviously be higher under an optimal dividend policy, since allowing equity holders additional policy
choices cannot lower their equilibrium value. Debt values will also be higher since the presence of
cash reserves may benet debt holders in the event of liquidation (by increasing their receipts from
liquidation), but it cannot, in any circumstance, hurt them.
6 Quantifying the Impact of Optimal Dividends
In this section, we quantify the impact of allowing dividend policies to be chosen optimally (rather
than as the residual consequence of debt-service policy) and the role played by equity-issuance costs
in this regard. To this end, we adopt the zero-coupon debt structure of Section 5 and utilize the
characterization of optimal dividend policies provided there.
A preliminary comment is in order here. It would perhaps be ideal to perform this comparison
in a setting with a general debt structure. However, analytic results on the structure of equilibrium
are hard to obtain in our model in the general case of coupon debt (see Section 9 for more on this
issue).
7
Indeed, even in the case of zero-coupon debt, Section 5 shows that optimal policies will
exhibit a considerable degree of path dependence. Such path-dependence may inject greater realism
into the model, but it also complicates analysis; in particular, numerical methods are required to
identify equilibrium values.
7
Our use of a simple debt structure is not special. Virtually the entire literature in this area has focussed either
on zero-coupon debt, or|in the case of some continuous-time models|on debt structures involving a \continuous"
coupon. In all cases, analytical tractability has been the guiding factor.
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We proceed in several steps. In Section 6.1, we describe a common framework, involving specic
assumptions on the cash ow process, liquidation costs, etc., that forms the basis of our compar-
isons. Then, in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, we describe equilibrium under residual and optimal policies,
respectively, in this common framework; this is a specialization and strengthening of the material
of Section 5. Section 6.4 presents the parameter congurations used in our comparisons. For these
congurations, equilibrium debt and equity values are simulated numerically under residual and
optimal dividend policies. These are presented in Sections 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. The results
are compared in Section 6.7.
Sections 7 and 8 build on this analysis in two directions. Section 7 looks at the marginal impact
of strategic debt service, by examining equilibriumvalues with and without this possibility. Section 8
compares our results to an analog of Merton's model in our setting. Both sections use the common
framework developed in Section 6.1; for comparability reasons, the parameter congurations used
are also kept common to the extent possible.
6.1 A Common Framework
We use a binomial framework similar to the one in Anderson and Sundaresan [3], which in turn is
a discrete-time version of the geometric Brownian motion process used by Merton [32], Leland [26],
Mella-Barral and Perraudin [30], and others. The riskless rate of interest per period is presumed
to be a constant  > 0. The remaining structure is described below.
The Cash Flow Process
Cash ows evolve according to a multiplicative binomial process: if f
t
represents the realized cash
ow in period t, the distribution of cash ows in period t+ 1 is given by
e
f
t+1
=
8
<
:
uf
t
; with probability p
df
t
; with probability 1  p
(6.1)
Appendix A shows that under (6.1), the value process fV
t
g is proportional to the cash ow process:
V
t
= b
 1
 f
t
; (6.2)
with the constant of proportionality b given by b = [1   (pu + (1   p)d)]. Of course, from (6.1)
and (6.2), V
t
itself follows a binomial process with parameters u and d:
e
V
t+1
=
8
<
:
uV
t
; with probability p
dV
t
; with probability 1  p
(6.3)
Anderson and Sundaresan [3] arrive at expressions (6.1){(6.3) using a somewhat dierent, but
essentially equivalent, procedure. They posit the process (6.3) for rm value, and then assume
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that cash ows and rm value are related by (6.2) to arrive at the process (6.1) for cash ows.
Expression (6.3) is also the discrete-time equivalent of the geometric Brownian motion process for
rm value used by Merton [32], Leland [26], and others. However, Merton and Leland do not
explicitly introduce or make use of cash ows in their models.
Liquidation Costs
We take the total liquidation cost L to have the form L = `
0
+`
1
A, where `
0
is the xed component
of liquidation costs, `
1
the proportional component, and A the total value of the rm's assets. If
the rm never carries forward any cash reserves, we have A = V , where V is the present value of
the current and future periodic cash ows. If cash reserves are allowed and the rm has a current
cash reservoir of , then A = V + . Observe that the eective post-liquidation value of the rm
is maxf0; A  Lg; for notational simplicity, we will henceforth denote this quantity by (A  L)
+
.
Equity{Issuance Costs
The equity-issuance costs are also assumed to be linear: if the rm issues an amount e of equity,
the cost it incurs is m
0
+m
1
e, where m
0
;m
1
are non-negative constants. Thus, the net receipts to
the rm from issuing an amount e of equity are (1 m
1
)e m
0
.
Payos in Liquidation
The Absolute Priority Rule will be assumed to hold in equilibrium. If c denotes the face value of
debt, then liquidation at maturity results in the debtholders receiving the payo
D
L
T
(APR) = minfc; (A  L)
+
g; (6.4)
while equity-holders receive the residual amount A D
L
T
(APR) = maxf0; A   L  cg.
6.2 Equilibrium under Residual Dividends
In the residual dividends model, no cash reserves are maintained by the equityholders. Thus, if f
T
denotes the realized cash ow in period T , and V
T
= b
 1
f
T
the value of current and future cash
ows, the cost of liquidating the rm at time T is
L
T
= `
0
+ `
1
 V
T
: (6.5)
Consequently, the liquidation value to debtholders in period T is given by
D
L
T
(APR) = minf(V
T
  L
T
)
+
; cg: (6.6)
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Now, if f
T
 D
L
T
, then it is optimal for equityholders to oer D
L
T
(APR) as debt service, and debt
and equity values resolve accordingly. However, if f
T
< D
L
T
, liquidation can only be avoided by
raising equity of e
T
, where f
T
+ e
T
  (m
0
+m
1
e
T
) = D
L
T
(APR), or
e
T
=
1
1 m
1
[D
L
T
(APR)  f
T
+m
0
]: (6.7)
Let m
T
denote the cost of raising the equity level required to avoid liquidation:
m
T
=
8
<
:
m
0
+m
1
 e
T
; if f
T
< D
L
T
(APR)
0; otherwise
(6.8)
Thus, given V
T
, the period{T values of equity and debt are
V
E
T
(V
T
) = V
T
 D
L
T
(APR) minfL
T
;m
T
g: (6.9)
V
D
T
(V
T
) = D
L
T
(APR): (6.10)
In earlier periods, all available cash ow is paid out as dividends to the equity holders. Thus,
given V
t
, the period{t values of debt and equity are given by
V
D
t
(V
t
) = [pV
D
t+1
(uV
t
) + (1  p)V
D
t+1
(dV
t
)]: (6.11)
V
E
t
(V
t
) = bV
t
+ [pV
E
t+1
(uV
t
) + (1  p)V
E
t+1
(dV
t
)]: (6.12)
Together with a backwards-induction argument, expressions (6.9){(6.12) complete the description
of equilibrium in the residual dividends model.
6.3 Equilibrium under Optimal Dividends
The optimal dividend policy upto period T   2 was described in Section 5.1. We now describe the
optimization problem that determines the choice of period{(T 1) dividends. Let 
T 1
denote the
cash reserves entering period T 1, and suppose f
T 1
is the realized cash ow in period T   1. The
maximum cash reserves that the equity holders can carry into period T is

max
= (1 + )[
T 1
+ f
T 1
]: (6.13)
We will describe the value of equity that results if the cash reserves entering period T are chosen
to be  for any given  2 [0; 
max
]. Maximizing this equity value over  then delivers the optimal
value of equity|and the optimal dividend level|in period T   1. To this end, observe, rst, that
given , the dividend payment to equity holders in period T   1 is
Æ
T
= 
T 1
+ f
T 1
  : (6.14)
Optimal Dividends & Risky Debt Valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Now, suppose the realized cash ow in period T is f
T
. Given , f
T
, and V
T
= b
 1
f
T
, the cost of
liquidating the rm in T is given by
L
T
= `
0
+ `
1
 (V
T
+ ): (6.15)
Consequently, the liquidation value to debtholders in period T is given by
D
L
T
(APR) = minf(V
T
+   L
T
)
+
; cg: (6.16)
If the available cash f
T
+ exceeds D
L
T
, it is optimal to oer D
L
T
to the debtholders and to raise no
new equity. However, if f
T
+  < D
L
T
, liquidation can be avoided only by raising equity of e
T
> 0,
where e
T
satises f
T
+ + e
T
  (m
0
+m
1
e
T
) = D
L
T
(APR), or:
e
T
=
1
1 m
1
[D
L
T
(APR)  f
T
  +m
0
]: (6.17)
Let m
T
denote the cost of raising the equity level required to avoid liquidation:
m
T
=
8
<
:
m
0
+m
1
 e
T
; if f
T
+  < D
L
T
(APR)
0; otherwise
(6.18)
Then, given  and V
T
, the period{T values of equity and debt resolve as
V
E
T
(; V
T
) = V
T
+  D
L
T
 minfL
T
;m
T
g: (6.19)
V
D
T
(; V
T
) = D
L
T
: (6.20)
Under (6.1), either V
T
= uV
T 1
or V
T
= dV
T 1
. Using this, the time T   1 value of equity,
conditional on , is
Æ
T 1
+ [pV
E
T
(; uV
T 1
) + (1  p)V
E
T
(; dV
T 1
)]: (6.21)
Equityholders now choose  2 [0; 
max
] to maximize (6.21). The maximized value of (6.21) is, of
course, the equilibrium time T   1 value of equity, given V
T 1
and 
T 1
. Given the optimal choice


, moreover, the optimal dividend policy at T   1 is determined via (6.14). Finally, given 

, the
equilibrium debt value at T   1 is just
V
D
T 1
(V
T 1
; 
T 1
) = [pV
D
T
(

; uV
T 1
) + (1  p)V
D
T
(

; dV
T 1
)]: (6.22)
For points in time t < T   1, the problem is much simpler. We have already seen that it is
optimal to have a zero dividend policy upto T   1. Thus, the value of equity at time t is simply
the discounted expected value of equity at time (t + 1) given zero dividends. Values of debt are
derived analogously. The initial values of debt and equity may thus be recoverd.
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6.4 Numerical Analysis: The Parameter Values
Having described the structure of equilibria under the two regimes, we proceed now to a numerical
computation of these equilibrium payos for a wide range of parameterizations. In this subsection,
we describe the parameter congurations used in this exercise. These congurations are also used
in computing equilibrium values in Sections 7 and 8.
As in Anderson and Sundaresan [3], the initial rm value is normalized throughout to V
0
= 1,
and the zero-coupon debt is taken to have a maturity of 10 years. Concerning the other parameters,
we use a total of 486 dierent congurations:
1. Three values are considered for the variable cost of issuing equity: m
1
2 f0; 0:15; 0:99g;
the xed cost m
0
is set to zero. The extreme values m
1
= 0 and m
1
= 0:99 correspond,
respectively, to the assumptions of Mella-Barral and Perraudin [30] (zero equity-issuance
costs), and Anderson and Sundaresan [3] (prohibitively high costs). The middle value of
m
1
= 0:15 is a more realistic value given empirical evidence.
2. Three values are considered for the value of debt: c 2 f0:25; 0:50; 0:75g. Given the initial rm
value of unity, these cover the range from relatively safe to risky debt.
3. Three values are considered for the xed cost of liquidation (l
0
= 0; 0:10; 0:20), and two for
the variable cost (l
1
= 0:25; 0:35).
4. Three values are considered for the annualized volatility  of the fV
t
g process: 
2
2 f0:03; 0:10; 0:20g.
These are the three values considered in Anderson and Sundaresan [3], and correspond to low,
medium, and high volatility rms.
5. Three values are considered for the cash-ow-to-value constant: b 2 f0:015; 0:025; 0:035g.
These correspond, intuitively, to high, medium, and low price/earnings ratios.
Of course, we do not report equilibrium values for all the parameter combinations here. Parameter
values for the 8 tables presented in this paper were chosen as a representative subset and, wherever
relevant, also to highlight special features of the equilibrium process.
6.5 Equilibrium Values under Residual Dividends
Tables 1 and 2 summarize equilibrium payos under residual dividends for a number of parameter
values. Table 1 considers a range of liquidation costs, equity-issuance costs, and face values of debt.
The volatility  and the cash-ow-to-value proportion b are held xed in this table at their middle
values. Complementing Table 1, Table 2 looks at equilibrium values as b and  vary for xed values
for the other parameters.
Consider Table 1 rst. The most prominent feature of this table is that equilibrium debt
values|and, hence, spreads over the riskless rate |are independent of the equity-issuance cost
parameter m
1
. This seemingly counterintuitive property obtains because under strategic debt
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service, debtholders receive only their reservation value in equilibrium (viz., the amount they obtain
in liquidation), and this latter quantity is independent of equity-issuance costs under a residual
dividend policy! (Importantly, this is not true in the optimal dividends model. There, as we
will see, the size of the cash reserves |which aects liquidation payos of the debtholders|will
depend in an essential manner on equity-issuance costs.)
Of course, equilibrium equity values are not independent of m
1
: they decline as m
1
increases.
This is intuitive: although debtholders receive the same amount regardless of m
1
, the cash ow f
t
will, in some states, be insuÆcient to make this payment, and it may be worthwhile for equityholders
to raise the balance by issuing equity. The cost of issuing equity reduces equity value.
Tables 1 and 2 also exhibit some other interesting relationships, namely that equilibrium spreads
increase with (i) an increase in liquidation costs, (ii) an increase in the face value c of the debt,
(iii) an increase in the ratio b, and (iv) an increase in the volatility . The rst of these is simply a
consequence of the fact that debtholders only receive their liquidation payos in equilibrium, and
higher liquidation costs reduce these liquidation payos. The second obtains from the fact that a
higher face value c increases the risk of default. The third relationship is a little more subtle. Since
the initial value V
0
is being held xed at unity, a higher value for b means more of this initial value
is being realized as cash up front, and a correspondingly smaller amount is available at maturity
of the debt; this increases the equilibrium spread. Lastly, an increase in volatility creates higher
cash ows in \good" states (those at the top of the tree), but poorer ones in the \bad" states
(those at the bottom of the tree). The upside gain from this increased volatility is limited since
the debtholder does not benet from increases in cash ows that are greater than the face value;
however, the downside risk increases as cash ows in poor states fall further.
6.6 Equilibrium Values under Optimal Dividends
Tables 3 and 4 summarize equilibrium payos under optimal dividends for the same parameter
congurations used in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
One immediate consequence of allowing for dividend policies and cash reserves to be optimally
chosen is that equilibrium behavior becomes very much more complex. Nowhere is this increased
complexity better reected than in the dependence of equilibrium spreads on equity-issuance costs.
\In general," spreads decrease as equity-issuance costs increase; but in some cases, U-shaped be-
havior is witnessed with spreads rst decreasing, then increasing, as m
1
increases. This behavior
arises from a combination of factors. To avoid costly liquidation, equityholders face two options.
They can transport cash as reserves across periods, or they can raise cash by issuing new equity
as needed. The more the equity-issuance costs, the greater the incentive to avoid liquidation using
cash reserves rather than new equity, so the greater the cash reserves carried. Since debtholders
have rst claim on these reserves in liquidation, this raises debtholders' liquidation values, hence
their payos in equilibrium. Thus, spreads will, \in general," fall as equity-issuance costs increase.
However, unlike raising equity, carrying cash reserves has the disadvantage that the size of cash
reserves is decided in advance, before the state of the world next period is realized. To see the
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problem this creates, consider a situation where even carrying the maximum reserves, liquidation
cannot be avoided using just the reserves in one of the two states next period. If equity issuance
costs are suÆciently high that new equity issuance is also not a protable way to avoid liquidation,
equityholders face a simple choice: carry forward enough reserves to avoid liquidation in the one
state (and take the chance that in the \wrong" state these reserves will accrue to the debtholders
rst) or accept liquidation in both states. Intuitively, it is apparent that in some circumstances
at least the latter may be preferable, in which case, of course, zero reserves become optimal. This
means the reserves carried will be smaller than at lower equity costs where new equity issuance
could have been used to avoid liquidation protably. Moreover, as equity costs increase in size, the
number of states at which liquidation cannot be avoided also increases, so zero reserves become
optimal in more cases. This reduces liquidation payos to debtholders, leading to an increase in
spreads and creating the U-shaped curve in equity-issuance costs.
Table 3 also shows that under optimal dividends, equilibrium spreads increase with increases
in liquidation costs or the face value c of debt. Both features are consequences of the fact that
under strategic debt service, debtholders only receive their reservation (i.e., liquidation) values in
equilibrium. The rst arises because an increase in liquidation costs lowers this reservation value.
The second holds because an increase in c increases this reservation value by at most one-for-one,
but in some states by less than that (see expression (6.4)). Similarly, Table 4 shows that spreads
increase as the payout ratio b increases or as volatility  increases. These phenomena hold for
similar reasons as in the residual dividends case.
8
6.7 Comparison of Values and Spreads
Table 5 summarizes the dierences in equilibrium equity and debt values and spreads in the two
models for the parameter values considered in Tables 1 and 3. At zero equity costs, Proposition 5.4
shows that there is no dierence between the models since residual dividend policies are fully
optimal. As equity costs start rising however, the models start diverging.
When m
1
= 0:15, equity values predicted by the optimal dividends model are higher by about
3%{5% than the values predicted by the residual dividends model. Debt values are also typically
higher (as, indeed, they must be from Proposition 5.4), but there is greater variation here, with
the dierences being negligible in some cases and substantial in others. This behavior is reected
in the dierences in spreads; at m
1
= 0:15, the table shows that the spreads between the models
can be virtually identical for some parameterizations, but could also of the order of 30 basis points
or more for others.
As equity costs continue to increase, the dierence between the models becomes further exag-
gerated. An increase in equity costs decreases the protability of avoiding costly liquidation by
8
Actually, the arguments are a bit more complex here. Consider an increase in b, for instance. In this case, more
of the rm value is realized up-front as cash, and correspondingly less in the future. Under residual dividends, this
means automatically that there will be less cash to meet debt service at the time of maturity so spreads increase.
Under optimal dividends, however, what matters is the size of the accumulated cash reserves that are feasible, and
one has to check that these grow slower on average as b increases.
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raising new equity. This increases the importance of cash reserves. Since such reserves are forbidden
under residual dividend policies, \too much" liquidation occurs in this case, leading to lower equity
and debt values and higher spreads. Table 5 shows that in the limit, when new equity issuance is
prohibitively expensive, the dierence in equilibrium values could be dramatic: equity values under
optimal dividends could be 20% or more higher than under residual dividends, and spreads under
the optimal dividends model could be well over 200 basis points lower than those under the residual
dividends model.
To summarize, the dierence between residual and optimal dividend policies depends in an
essential way on equity-issuance costs. Where such costs do not exist, there is no dierence in
equilibrium values under the two policies. Where such costs are small or moderate, in some cases
the dierence can be small or even negligible; but in others, it can be very substantial. At very
high equity-issuance costs, the dierence is almost always signicant, with residual dividend policies
systematically undervaluing debt and overstating spreads.
7 The Role of Strategic Debt Service
Strategic underperformance of debt has been cited in the literature as a major determinant of overall
spreads on risky debt (see, e.g., Anderson and Sundaresan [3], or Mella{Barral and Perraudin [30]).
In this section, we examine the importance of strategic debt service to better understand its role in
the presence of equity costs and optimal dividend policies. To this end, we compare the equilibria of
Sections 6.5 and 6.6 to those that arise when debt service is non-strategic, i.e., when equityholders
pay the full face value of the debt if either the cash reserves by themselves permit this, or the
cost of raising suÆcient equity for this purpose is less than the cost of liquidation. Tables 6 and 7
summarize our ndings. The former looks at the residual dividends model and the latter at the
optimal dividends model.
A perusal of Table 6 reveals two very strong properties. First, the dierence in spreads is always
positive, meaning that spreads are always higher in the residual dividends model when there is
strategic debt service than when debt service is non-strategic. This is, of course, a consequence of
the fact that debtholders only receive their reservation (i.e., liquidation) payos if debt-service is
strategic, whereas in the non-strategic model, they always receive at least this much and typically
more.
Secondly, there is a strong monotonic relationship between equity-issuance costs and the relative
importance of strategic debt service: the dierence in spreads between the strategic and non-
strategic models is very high when equity-issuance costs are low, but declines rapidly as these costs
increase, becoming negligible in all cases when these costs become very high. Intuitively, as equity
costs increase, it becomes progressively less protable in general to meet debt obligations by raising
equity, and this has the impact of reducing the marginal importance of strategic debt-service. To
see how, consider the case where equity-issuance costs are prohibitively high, so liquidation can be
avoided, if at all, only by meeting debt-service with current cash ows. For strategic debt service
to even be a feasible option, two conditions must be met: (i) the cash ow in period T must exceed
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the reservation value of the debtholders, and (ii) this latter quantity must be less than c. If (i) fails,
liquidation necessarily results, while if (ii) fails, debtholders must be oered at least c, so there is
no underperformance. In notational terms, this means for strategic debt-service to be feasible, we
must have
f
T
 V
T
  L
T
: (7.1)
Since f
T
is proportional to V
T
, this may be rewritten as
(1  b)V
T
 L
T
= `
0
+ `
1
V
T
: (7.2)
When xed costs of liquidation are small, inequality (7.2) is obviously hard to meet unless the level
of variable costs is unrealistically high. This means strategic debt-service is unimportant at \most"
terminal states, and the spreads will resemble those in the non-strategic model.
9
Table 7 provides information on the importance of strategic debt service in the presence of an
optimal dividend policy. The table shows that in some respects the impact is qualitatively the same
as under residual dividends. For example, it is true here also (and for the same reason) that as
equity costs increase, the relative importance of strategic play falls.
However, there are also two major dierences. First, the quantitative impact of strategic debt
service can diverge substantially. For instance, at c = 0:50, m
1
= 0:15 in the third panel in the two
tables, the dierence is 262 bps in Table 7, but only 71 bps in Table 6.
More importantly, however, there is even a qualitative dierence. Under residual dividends,
Table 6 showed that spreads always increased in the presence of strategic debt service. Under
optimal dividends, Table 7 shows that strategic debt service could actually lead to a lower spread
in some cases than non-strategic debt service! To see how, consider a situation with prohibitively
high equity costs. Suppose that even when the entire cash reserves are carried into the last period,
the available cash will fall short of the due amount c in one state, but that there will be enough
cash to meet the minimum required \strategic" payment to avoid liquidation in that state. Under
strategic play, it will be optimal to carry the reserves into the next period and then make the
minimum required payment. Under non-strategic play, however, the reserves in excess of the
minimum payment will also go to the debtholders until the payment of c is reached. Given this
anticipated \overpayment," it will be optimal in some states for the equityholders to increase
dividend payments and carry lower reserves with them into the last period. This decreases the
payos to debtholders at maturity, increasing spreads.
To summarize, the impact of strategic debt service depends centrally on both equity issuance
costs as well as the dividend policy in place: (a) Under residual dividends, strategic debt service
9
This appears to conict with Anderson and Sundaresan [3] who nd that strategic debt-service is important in a
model with prohibitively high equity-issuance costs. There are two reasons for this. First, Anderson and Sundaresan
assume there are only xed costs of liquidation; when these xed costs are high, (7.2) is easier to meet. Second, there
appears to be an implicit (and apparently inconsistent) assumption in their paper that at date T alone, equityholders
can liquidate the rm costlessly to meet debt service requirements. This means the term f
T
on the right-hand side
of (7.1) is replaced with V
T
, so (7.1) will always hold.
Optimal Dividends & Risky Debt Valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
always results in larger spreads than non-strategic debt service, but this is not true under optimal
dividends, i.e., strategic debt service could lead to lower spreads than non-strategic debt service in
this case; (b) In both cases, the relative importance of strategic debt service diminshes as equity
costs rise; and (c) The quantitative impact may vary considerably across the two regimes with
the impact on spreads under optimal dividends being substantially more or substantially less than
under residual dividends.
8 Comparison with a Merton Model
As the third and nal step in our analysis, we compare the spreads predicted by our model (i.e.,
Table 3) to the corresponding numbers obtained from an analog of the model in Merton [32]. The
analogy will necessarily be imperfect, since ours is a cash-ow based model in which the treatment
of intermediate cash ows plays a major role, while Merton's model has no intermediate cash ows.
However, the spirit of Merton's model is implicitly one where all cash ows are used rst for debt
payment; that is, there is neither strategic debt-service nor an optimal dividend policy. Thus, a
version of Merton's model may be reproduced in our framework by assuming that (a) no dividend
payments occur until maturity of the debt, and (b) there is no strategic debt service. The rst
condition is identical to imposing a covenant on the rm that prohibits payment of any dividends
till the debt is retired.
It is obvious intuitively|and easy to show formally|that our model will generate spreads that
are higher than such a \modied-Merton" model. The only question therefore is the quantitative
nature of the dierence. This question is especially relevant given the inability of the Merton model
to generate spreads of the size typically observed in practice.
Table 8 compares the spreads generated by the modied-Merton model to those from the optimal
dividend model (Table 3). A glance at the table reveals that the optimal dividends model produces
spreads that are at least 125 bps larger than the modied-Merton model; more typically, this
dierence exceeds 250 bps. Thus, the optimal dividends model's performance is more in line with
observed evidence than the Merton model.
9 Coupon Debt
The path-dependence feature of optimal policies gets exacerbated by the presence of the interim
debt-service requirements when we move from zero-coupon debt to coupon debt. The signicant
additional complexity this introduces into the model manifests itself in two ways. First, it is no
longer possible to provide an analytical characterization of optimal dividend policies for coupon
debt along the lines of Proposition 5.1 for zero-coupon debt. Second, the properties of equilibrium
valuations themselves get aected in intricate ways.
To elaborate on this second point, consider, for deniteness, equilibrium debt valuations in the
case where equity-issuance costs are positive. When debt has a zero-coupon structure, Proposi-
tion 5.4 established that
Optimal Dividends & Risky Debt Valuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. With zero liquidation costs, equilibrium debt values are identical under optimal and residual
dividend policies.
2. With positive liquidation costs, equilibrium debt values are higher
10
under optimal dividend
policies than under residual dividend policies.
If the debt structure includes interim debt-service requirements, however, Proposition 9.1 below
shows that each of these properties is non-trivially aected:
1. With zero liquidation costs, equilibrium debt values are lower (possibly strictly) under optimal
dividend policies than under residual dividend policies.
2. With positive liquidation costs, equilibrium debt values under optimal dividend policies can
be higher or lower than under residual dividend policies, depending on the size of liquidation
costs and the debt structure in question.
Several aspects of these results are noteworthy. First, even with zero liquidation costs, optimal and
residual dividend policies can now have markedly dierent implications. Second, it is now possible
that optimal dividend policies lead to lower debt values (and therefore higher spreads) than residual
dividend policies, which is impossible under any circumstances with zero-coupon debt. Third, with
positive liquidation costs, the unambiguous relationship of Proposition 5.4 is replaced by ambiguity
on the over/under-valuation issue. A complete statement of the result follows.
Proposition 9.1 Suppose the debt structure has some interim debt-service requirements.
1. If there are no equity-issuance costs, equilibrium debt and equity values are identical under
optimal and residual dividend policies.
2. If equity-issuance costs are positive:
(a) If there are no liquidation costs, equity value is higher and debt value lower under an
optimal dividend policy than under a residual dividend policy. (These inequalities can be
strict.)
(b) If liquidation costs are non-zero, equity value is higher but debt value may be lower or
higher under an optimal dividend policy than under a residual dividend policy.
Proof With zero equity-issuance costs, residual dividend policies are fully optimal as outlined in
footnote 6 of Section 4, so assume equity-issuance costs are strictly positive. Now observe that,
regardless of liquidation costs, equity value must always be higher under optimal dividend policies
than residual dividend policies since equityholders cannot be worse o from having additional
courses of action available to them. Thus, it remains to be shown that (a) with zero liquidation
costs, debt values are lower under optimal dividend policies than residual dividend policies, and
10
As earlier, the terms \higher" and \lower" always refer to the weak inequalities  and , respectively.
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(b) with positive liquidation costs, debt values can be either higher or lower under optimal dividend
policies than under residual dividend policies.
To see (a), suppose there are no liquidation costs. In this case, the entire initial value V
0
of the
rm is divided between equity value V
E
0
and debt value V
D
0
, since expected future liquidation costs
are zero at all points. If V
E
0
is higher (as it must be under optimal dividend policies), then V
D
0
must necessarily be lower. That these inequalities can be strict is shown in Example C.1 below.
This establishes Part 2(a) of the proposition.
To see (b), consider rst a given coupon structure which is such that under zero liquidation
costs, equilibrium equity values are strictly higher and debt values strictly lower under optimal
dividends than residual dividends. (The specication in Example C.1 is an instance.) A simple
continuity argument establishes that if liquidation costs are positive but \small," these inequalities
will continue to hold. Thus, there exist scenarios where with positive liquidation costs, equilibrium
debt values are strictly lower under optimal dividends than under residual dividends establishing
one part of the desired result.
To see the other part, consider a specication for which under zero-coupon debt, debt value
is strictly higher under optimal dividends than residual dividends. (For instance, one of the spec-
ications in Sections 6{7.) Another continuity argument shows that if a \small" interim coupon
is appended to the debt-structure, the inequalities will continue to hold. Thus, it is also possible
that with positive liquidation costs, equilibrium debt values could be strictly higher under optimal
dividends than under residual dividends. This completes the proof of Proposition 9.1. 
The driving forces behind Proposition 9.1 are easily described from an intuitive standpoint. As
in Geske [17], coupon debt may be viewed as a compound option in the hands of equityholders in
which (a) the payment of a coupon entitles the option-holder to proceed to the next coupon, and
(b) the payment of the last-but-one coupon provides the equity holders with a call option to buy
the rm from the debtholders at a strike price equal to the last payment due on the debt. Viewed
in this light, the presence of coupons provides equityholders with additional options with which
to eect a transfer of value from debt-holders to themselves. Moving from residual to optimal
dividend policies enhances the equityholders' ability to exploit this optionality. As a consequence,
debtholders may become worse o than under residual dividend policies. These intuitive arguments
lie at the heart of our construction of Example C.1 and are made transparent there.
Proposition 9.1 further underscores the importance of assumptions concerning dividend poli-
cies in the presence of equity-issuance costs, and the mis-estimates that can result from ignoring
the interplay of these factors. However, giving quantitative expression to these biases is much
more diÆcult than was the case for Proposition 5.4: an analytical characterization of optimal div-
idend policies appears infeasible in the general case, and numerical estimation in the absence of
such a characterization would involve the practically impossible task of searching over all possible
dividend/debt-service policies. While this is unfortunate, it must be emphasized that the diÆculty
of working with coupon debt structures is not in itself new to our paper. Even in those models in
the literature whose optimal strategies have the happy feature of path-independence, only the case
of \continuous" coupons has proved tractable in general.
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10 Conclusions
This paper extends the models of Anderson and Sundaresan [3] and Mella-Barral and Perraudin [30]
in two directions: (a) dividend policy is determined optimally rather than as the residual conse-
quence of debt-service policy; and (b) the issuance of new equity is allowed to be a costly process.
All the other attractive features of their approach|using a cash-ow based model of rm value,
allowing for liquidation costs and strategic debt service|are retained.
We provide an analytical characterization of optimal policies in our model. Numerical analysis
of the equilibrium then shows that the quantitative (and even qualitiative) predictions of the model
depend in a central way on the two new features we introduce. In particular, we nd that:
 Assuming dividends are determined residually, rather than optimally, can bias yield spreads
predicted by the model upwards by as much as 200 basis points.
 The actual size of the bias depends crucially on equity-issuance costs. For small equity-
issuance costs the dierence can be negligible, but it typically rises substantially as equity-
issuance costs rise.
 The marginal impact of strategic debt-service (a factor that has received much attention
in the recent literature in this area) depends heavily on both equity-issuance costs and the
dividend policy in place.
{ In general, strategic debt-service only has a large eect on overall yield spreads when
equity-issuance costs are low.
{ Under residual dividend policies, strategic debt service always widens yield spreads.
However, under optimal dividend policies, strategtic debt service widens yield spreads
at low equity costs, but can actually narrow them at high equity costs.
In summary, our results indicate that ignoring the role of either of these two factors can result in
substantial bias entering the model's predictions.
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A The Binomial Cash Flow Process
We show in this Appendix that if the cash ow process f
e
f
t
g follows a multiplicative binomial
process, then the value process V
t
also follows a multiplicative binomial process. So suppose that
given f
t
, we have
e
f
t+1
=
(
uf
t
; with probability p
df
t
; with probability 1  p
(A.1)
By denition, we have
V
t
= f
t
+  E
t
(V
t+1
): (A.2)
Now note that since f
e
f
t
g is a stationary Markov process, so also is fV
t
g. In particular, V
t
depends
on the history of the cash ow process only through f
t
. Thus, we can write (A.2) as
V (f
t
) = f
t
+  E[V (
e
f
t+1
)]
= f
t
+  [pV (uf
t
) + (1  p)V (df
t
)]:
(A.3)
A standard argument using the Contraction Mapping Theorem shows that there can be one,
and only one, bounded function H() such that
H(f) = f + [pH(uf) + (1  p)H(df)]; f 2 R
+
: (A.4)
Since V () satises (A.4) by denition, it follows that the xed-point of T must coincide with V ,
and, therefore, that V is uniquely dened. On the other hand, a straightforward computation
shows that the function w dened by
w(f) =
f
[1  (pu+ (1  p)d)]
; f 2 R
+
(A.5)
also satises (A.4). By uniqueness, we must have V = w. It is immediate from this and (A.1) that
V also follows a multiplicative binomial process. 
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
The proof uses a backwards induction argument.
Period T In the last period, the equilibrium evidently has the same structure as it does in
the general case. Thus, given the cash reserves 
T
and the period{T realized cash ow f
T
, the
equilibrium debt and equity values at T are given by (4.2){(4.5).
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Period T   1 Given the cash reserves 
T 1
entering T   1 and the realized cash ow f
T 1
in
that period, the owner{manager must decide on the dividend Æ
T 1
to be paid that period. (There
is no debt-service amount to be considered.) For each choice of Æ
T 1
, the period{T cash reserves

T
are determined as

T
= (1 + )(
T 1
+ f
T 1
  Æ
T 1
): (B.6)
The one-to-one relationship between Æ
T 1
and 
T
present in (B.6) implies that we could equivalently
model the owner as picking 
T
directly, rather than Æ
T 1
. This minor change of perspective turns
out to simplify exposition considerably. Note that since Æ
T 1
must lie between 0 and (
T 1
+f
T 1
),
the range of feasible values for 
T
is [0; 
max
T
], where

max
T
= (1 + )(
T 1
+ f
T 1
): (B.7)
Pick any  2 [0; 
max
T
]. Let E
T 1
[V
E
T
()] denote the expected continuation value of equity
given , where the expectation is conditional on all information available upto T   1 and is taken
over possible realizations of period{T cash ow f
T
. Since the choice of  implies a period{(T   1)
dividend of Æ
T 1
= 
T 1
+f
T 1
 , the value of equity in period T  1 implied by the choice  is
(
T 1
+ f
T 1
  ) + E
T 1
[V
E
T
()]: (B.8)
The owner-manager selects  to maximize (B.8); the maximized value is the equilibrium value
of equity in period T   1:
V
E
T 1
= max
2[0;
max
T
]
f(
T 1
+ f
T 1
  ) + E
T 1
[V
E
T
()]g: (B.9)
Period T   2 Let 
T 2
be the cash reserves entering period T   2, and let f
T 2
be the realized
cash ows in that period. Dene 
max
T 1
= (1 + )(
T 2
+ f
T 2
). Analogous reasoning to that used
in deriving the period T   1 equilibrium value establishes that in period T   2, the owner manager
picks  to solve
V
E
T 2
= max
2[0;
max
T 1
]
f(
T 2
+ f
T 2
  ) + E
T 2
[V
E
T 1
()]g: (B.10)
We will show that  = 
max
T 1
solves this maximization problem. To this end, observe that the
value of V
E
T 1
from (B.9) may be written as
V
E
T 1
= 
T 1
+ max
2[0;
max
T
]
f(f
T 1
  ) + E
T 1
[V
E
T
()]g: (B.11)
Moreover, since the maximand on the right-hand side (the term in braces) does not depend on

T 1
, the maximization problem is aected by 
T 1
only through its eect on 
max
T
. Since 
max
T
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increases as 
T 1
increases, a larger value of 
T 1
implies a larger feasible set of actions, and,
therefore, a (weakly) larger value of the maximized function. Putting all this together, it is seen
that the time T   1 value of equity has the representation
V
E
T 1
= 
T 1
+G(
T 1
); (B.12)
where G() is a non-decreasing function. We use this representation in (B.10). Substituting for
V
E
T 1
from (B.12), we can write the time T   2 value of equity as
V
E
T 2
= max
2[0;
max
T 1
]
f(
T 2
+ f
T 2
  ) + E
T 2
[+G()]g: (B.13)
The term  can clearly be pulled out of the expectation on the right-hand side. Doing so, and
cancelling the common term  that results, this yields:
V
E
T 2
= max
2[0;
max
T 1
]
f
T 2
+ f
T 2
+ E
T 2
[G()]g: (B.14)
Now, G, as we have already seen, is a non-decreasing function of . Since the rest of the
maximand is independent of , it follows easily that one solution to (B.14) is to have  = 
max
T 1
, in
particular, to pay no dividends at all in period T   2.
Period t < T   2 An identical argument to that used for period T   2 establishes that it is an
optimal policy in each preceding period to not pay any dividends, and instead to hold back the
entire cash ow in the rm. This completes the proof of the proposition. 
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Part 1 of the proposition is an immediate consequence of Corollary 5.3. We show part 2 here. Note
that for equity values, this statement is obviously true: equity values cannot decrease when equity
holders have additional alternatives available to them. To prove that debt values are also higher
in this case, we use a backwards induction argument. Denote by V
D
t
(
t
) the time{t value of debt
in the model where dividends may be chosen optimally, given that cash reserves at the begining of
period t are 
t
; and by V
D
t
the corresponding quantity in the constrained model, where all excess
cash is paid out as dividends. We will show that we must have V
D
t
(
t
)  V
D
t
for every t, which
will obviously establish the desired result.
Let D
L
T
(
T
) denote the payo to debt holders in the optimal-dividends model if liquidation were
to occur at T given the cash reserves 
T
. Of course, D
L
T
(0) will be the liquidation payo to debt
holders at T in the constrained model. Note that we must have D
L
T
(
T
)  D
L
T
(0) for any 
T
 0.
Period T As we have seen above (expressions (4.2){(4.5)), strategic debt-service by equity holders
means that the equilibrium time{T value of debt in the unconstrained model is given by the debt-
holders liquidation payos: V
D
T
(
T
) = D
L
T
(
T
). A similar argument shows that in the constrained
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model also, the time T value of debt is given by V
D
T
= D
L
T
(0). Of course, this means we must have
V
D
T
(
T
)  V
D
T
.
Period T   1 Let 
T 1
denote the cash reserves at the begining of T   1. Given any dividend
policy, let 
T
 0 denote the cash reserves that will exist at the begining of period T in the
optimal-dividends model. Then, we must have
V
D
T 1
(
T 1
) = E
T 1
[V
D
T
(
T
)]  E
T 1
[V
D
T
] = V
D
T 1
: (B.15)
Period t < T   1 An easy backwards induction argument using (B.15) now establishes that
V
D
t
(
t
)  V
D
t
for each t, completing the proof. 
C Optimal Dividends in Coupon-Debt: An Example
The following example illustrates that even with zero liquidation costs, the implications of optimal
and residual dividend policies could dier if debt is of the coupon form; and, in particular, that
residual dividend policies could substantially overestimate the value of debt in this case.
Example C.1 Consider a cash ow process specied by f
1
= f
2
= f
3
= 1,
f
4
=
8
<
:
160; with probability 1=2
80; with probability 1=2
(C.16)
and f
t
= 0 for t  5. To x ideas, it may help to think of this as a project with a three-period
gestation at the end of which it is marketed, and is either a success (resulting in a cash ow of 160)
or a failure (a cash ow of 80). Letting  = (1 + )
 1
as usual, the present value of this project is
V
1
= 1 +  + 
2
+ 
3
[(160 + 80)=2]: (C.17)
Now consider a coupon-debt structure for this project, where a coupon payment of 2 is due in
period 2, and a coupon of 2 and the principal face value of 100 are due in period 4. In terms of our
notation, we have:
c
2
= 2; c
4
= 102; c
t
= 0 for all t 6= 2; 4: (C.18)
Next, we assume that if liquidation occurs in period t, the debt-holders are owed an amount equal to
the coupon due in period t plus the face value of the debt (this rule has been employed in practice).
Thus, for the two periods where default may occur and the debt holders can force liquidation, we
have C
2
= C
4
= 102. Finally, we assume there are no liquidation costs: L
t
= 0 for all t; that new
equity issuance is prohibitively expensive (m(e) = e); and that the APR holds.
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Consider the residual dividends model rst. We proceed by backwards induction. (a) At t = 4,
given zero liquidation costs, any underperformance on the debt contract will automatically trigger
liquidation of the rm. Thus, debt holders receive either minf160; 102g or minf80; 102g depending
on which state of the world occurs. (b) At t = 3, there is no coupon due, so the cash ow of 1 is
paid out as dividends. (c) At t = 2, there is insuÆcient cash to meet the coupon payment of 2.
There are two alternatives facing the debt holders: (a) accept a payment of   1 and allow the
rm to continue, or (b) liquidate the rm. In the former case, the value to the debt holders is
 + 
2
[(minf160; 102g +minf80; 102g)=2] = 
+
91
2
: (C.19)
If liquidation is chosen at this time, the value of the rm is 1++
2
[(160+80)=2] = (1++120
2
.
Thus, the value to the debtholders from liquidation is
minf1 +  + 120
2
; 102g: (C.20)
It is easily checked that the dierence between (C.20) and (C.19) is strictly positive for all  2 (0; 1)
and  2 [0; 1]. It is immediate that debt holders will always choose liquidation in period 2, so debt
and equity values resolve as
V
D
=  minf1 +  + 120
2
; 102g: (C.21)
V
E
= 1 +  maxf0; 1 +  + 120
2
  102g; (C.22)
We turn now to the optimal dividends model. Carrying out the computations as above shows
that the equilibrium strategy for equity holders is to receive no dividends in period 1; to receive all
excess cash after paying the coupon as dividends in period 2; to receive a dividend of 1 in period
3; and to receive the residual amount (either 160  minf160; 102g or 80 minf80; 102g) in period
4. The values of debt and equity under this strategy are easily seen to be
V
D
= (2 + 91
2
): (C.23)
V
E
= (+  + 29
2
): (C.24)
Inspection of (C.21){(C.24) makes it immediate that for all reasonable values of , debt values
are signicantly higher, and equity values signicantly lower, in the residual dividends model than
in the optimal dividends model. For select values of , numerical values of debt and equity and
yield spreads predicted by either model are provided in Table 9.
The numbers in the table bear out the claim made above that ignoring the possibility of an
optimal dividend policy under coupon debt could result in overvaluation of debt and a consequent
underestimation of yield spreads. Indeed, the table shows that the dierences in yield spreads
may be very signicant from a quantitative standpoint: in each case the spread under the optimal
dividends model is substantially larger (by 300 bps or more) than the corresponding gure under
residual dividends. 
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Table 1: Equity and Debt values under Residual Dividend Policy
This table describes debt and equity values (V
D
and V
D
, respectively) and spreads of debt yields over
the risk-free rate under residual dividend policies for the binomial cash ow model. Two parameters
in the table are held xed: the volatility  at 
2
= 0:10, and the payout ratio b at b = 0:025. The
remaining paremeters are as described in the table. c is the face-value of zero-coupon debt, m
0
and
m
1
are the xed and proportional costs of raising new equity, respectively, and l
0
and l
1
are the
xed and proportional costs of liquidation, respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
l
0
= 0:0; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.868 0.132 128.3
0.15 0.847 0.132 128.3
0.99 0.727 0.132 128.3
0.50 0.00 0.786 0.214 341.3
0.15 0.751 0.214 341.3
0.99 0.640 0.214 341.3
0.75 0.00 0.732 0.268 530.1
0.15 0.687 0.268 530.1
0.99 0.586 0.268 530.1
l
0
= 0:1; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.889 0.111 303.8
0.15 0.872 0.111 303.8
0.99 0.697 0.111 303.8
0.50 0.00 0.817 0.183 505.6
0.15 0.787 0.183 505.6
0.99 0.620 0.183 505.6
0.75 0.00 0.773 0.227 705.9
0.15 0.736 0.227 705.9
0.99 0.575 0.227 705.9
l
0
= 0:2; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.909 0.091 506.5
0.15 0.895 0.091 506.5
0.99 0.680 0.091 506.5
0.50 0.00 0.850 0.150 714.6
0.15 0.826 0.150 714.6
0.99 0.616 0.150 714.6
0.75 0.00 0.807 0.193 878.2
0.15 0.775 0.193 878.2
0.99 0.572 0.193 878.2
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Table 2: Equity and Debt values under Residual Dividend Policy
This table describes debt and equity values (V
D
and V
E
, respectively) and spreads of debt yields
over the risk-free rate under residual dividend policies for the binomial cash ow model. Fixed and
proportional costs of liquidation are held xed at l
0
= 0:1 and l
1
= 0:25, respectively, and c, the
face-value of zero-coupon debt is xed at 0.50. Volatility is held xed in the rst panel at 
2
= 0:10
and the payout ratio, b is held xed in the second panel at b = 0:025. m
0
and m
1
are the xed and
proportional costs of raising new equity, respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
Eect of varying payout ratio b
m
1
b V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.00 0.015 0.795 0.205 387.4
0.025 0.817 0.183 505.6
0.035 0.840 0.160 649.4
0.10 0.015 0.774 0.205 387.4
0.025 0.798 0.183 505.6
0.035 0.825 0.160 649.4
0.15 0.015 0.761 0.205 387.4
0.025 0.787 0.183 505.6
0.035 0.815 0.160 649.4
0.99 0.015 0.559 0.205 387.4
0.025 0.620 0.183 505.6
0.035 0.675 0.160 649.4
Eect of varying volatility 
m
1

2
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.00 0.03 0.755 0.245 202.2
0.10 0.817 0.183 505.6
0.20 0.868 0.132 853.8
0.10 0.03 0.729 0.245 202.2
0.10 0.798 0.183 505.6
0.20 0.855 0.132 853.8
0.15 0.03 0.714 0.245 202.2
0.10 0.787 0.183 505.6
0.20 0.847 0.132 853.8
0.99 0.03 0.548 0.245 202.2
0.10 0.620 0.183 505.6
0.20 0.691 0.132 853.8
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Table 3: Equity and Debt values under Optimal Dividend Policy
This table describes debt and equity values (V
D
and V
D
, respectively) and spreads of debt yields over
the risk-free rate under residual dividend policies for the binomial cash ow model. Two parameters
in the table are held xed: the volatility  at 
2
= 0:10, and the payout ratio b at b = 0:025. The
remaining paremeters are as described in the table. c is the face-value of zero-coupon debt, m
0
and
m
1
are the xed and proportional costs of raising new equity, respectively, and l
0
and l
1
are the
xed and proportional costs of liquidation, respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
l
0
= 0:0; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.868 0.132 128.3
0.15 0.864 0.132 125.5
0.99 0.861 0.137 93.0
0.50 0.00 0.786 0.214 341.3
0.15 0.769 0.220 312.9
0.99 0.757 0.219 316.2
0.75 0.00 0.732 0.268 530.1
0.15 0.705 0.274 505.8
0.99 0.675 0.272 515.4
l
0
= 0:1; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.889 0.111 303.8
0.15 0.884 0.111 303.8
0.99 0.868 0.128 154.6
0.50 0.00 0.817 0.183 505.6
0.15 0.805 0.183 505.2
0.99 0.762 0.193 450.6
0.75 0.00 0.773 0.227 705.9
0.15 0.752 0.227 705.9
0.99 0.679 0.233 676.8
l
0
= 0:2; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.909 0.091 506.5
0.15 0.903 0.091 506.5
0.99 0.885 0.115 270.8
0.50 0.00 0.850 0.150 714.6
0.15 0.838 0.155 678.5
0.99 0.782 0.190 467.0
0.75 0.00 0.807 0.193 878.2
0.15 0.791 0.194 876.0
0.99 0.696 0.220 741.2
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Table 4: Equity and Debt values under Optimal Dividend Policy
This table describes debt and equity values (V
D
and V
E
, respectively) and spreads of debt yields
over the risk-free rate under residual dividend policies for the binomial cash ow model. Fixed and
proportional costs of liquidation are held xed at l
0
= 0:1 and l
1
= 0:25, respectively, and c, the
face-value of zero-coupon debt is xed at 0.50. Volatility is held xed in the rst panel at 
2
= 0:10
and the payout ratio, b is held xed in the second panel at b = 0:025. m
0
and m
1
are the xed and
proportional costs of raising new equity, respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
Eect of varying payout ratio b
m
1
b V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.00 0.015 0.795 0.205 387.4
0.025 0.817 0.183 505.6
0.035 0.840 0.160 649.4
0.10 0.015 0.787 0.205 387.2
0.025 0.810 0.183 505.2
0.035 0.833 0.160 648.7
0.15 0.015 0.782 0.205 387.2
0.025 0.805 0.183 505.2
0.035 0.829 0.160 648.7
0.99 0.015 0.699 0.206 379.0
0.025 0.762 0.193 450.6
0.035 0.787 0.173 566.6
Eect of varying volatility 
m
1

2
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps)
0.00 0.03 0.755 0.245 202.2
0.10 0.817 0.183 505.6
0.20 0.868 0.132 853.8
0.10 0.03 0.744 0.250 183.5
0.10 0.810 0.183 505.2
0.20 0.861 0.134 832.7
0.15 0.03 0.740 0.250 183.5
0.10 0.805 0.183 505.2
0.20 0.858 0.134 832.6
0.99 0.03 0.710 0.261 140.3
0.10 0.762 0.193 450.6
0.20 0.816 0.148 732.9
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Table 5: Comparison of Optimal and Residual Dividend Policies
This table describes the dierences in debt and equity values (V
D
and V
E
, respectively) and in
spreads of debt yields over the risk-free rate between the optimal and residual dividends models.
The parameter values are the same as in Tables 1 and 3. The volatility  is held xed at 
2
= 0:10,
and the payout ratio b is xed at b = 0:025. The remaining parameters are as described in the
table. c is the face-value of zero-coupon debt, m
0
and m
1
are the xed and proportional costs of
raising new equity, respectively, and l
0
and l
1
are the xed and proportional costs of liquidation,
respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
l
0
= 0:0; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0163 0.0004 2.86
0.99 0.1331 0.0047 35.32
0.50 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0187 0.0060 28.42
0.99 0.1169 0.0053 25.13
0.75 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0179 0.0063 24.33
0.99 0.0897 0.0038 14.68
l
0
= 0:1; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0125 0.0000 0.00
0.99 0.1713 0.0174 149.15
0.50 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0180 0.0001 0.35
0.99 0.1424 0.0099 54.98
0.75 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0161 0.0000 0.00
0.99 0.1037 0.0063 29.13
l
0
= 0:2; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0081 0.0000 0.00
0.99 0.2056 0.0233 235.67
0.50 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0120 0.0052 36.17
0.99 0.1667 0.0396 247.63
0.75 0.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.15 0.0157 0.0004 2.20
0.99 0.1242 0.0262 137.06
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Table 6: Residual Dividend Policy without Strategic Debt service
This table describes the dierence in debt and equity values (V
D
and V
E
, respectively) and spreads
of debt yields over the risk-free rate under residual dividend policies for the binomial cash ow model
when debt service is strategic and non-strategic. The parameter combinations are the same as in
Table 1. The volatility  is held xed at 
2
= 0:10, and the payout ratio b is xed at b = 0:025.
The remaining parameters are as described in the table. c is the face-value of zero-coupon debt, m
0
and m
1
are the xed and proportional costs of raising new equity, respectively, and l
0
and l
1
are the
xed and proportional costs of liquidation, respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
l
0
= 0:0; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.862 0.132 123.7 0.0057  0:0006 4.61
0.15 0.844 0.132 123.7 0.0032  0:0006 4.61
0.99 0.443 0.132 128.3 0.2844 0.0000 0.00
0.50 0.00 0.761 0.226 284.2 0.0247  0:0122 57.17
0.15 0.738 0.214 341.3 0.0125 0.0000 0.00
0.99 0.419 0.214 341.3 0.2207 0.0000 0.00
0.75 0.00 0.692 0.283 473.6 0.0404  0:0148 56.51
0.15 0.665 0.268 530.1 0.0221 0.0000 0.00
0.99 0.414 0.268 530.1 0.1713 0.0000 0.00
l
0
= 0:1; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.869 0.121 217.0 0.0197  0:0098 86.79
0.15 0.851 0.121 217.0 0.0208  0:0098 86.79
0.99 0.450 0.111 302.2 0.2469  0:0002 1.63
0.50 0.00 0.768 0.206 382.9 0.0491  0:0228 122.73
0.15 0.745 0.183 503.9 0.0424  0:0003 1.68
0.99 0.426 0.183 504.6 0.1936  0:0002 1.01
0.75 0.00 0.699 0.252 595.6 0.0746  0:0248 110.31
0.15 0.672 0.227 705.1 0.0634  0:0002 0.83
0.99 0.421 0.227 705.1 0.1539  0:0002 0.83
l
0
= 0:2; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.882 0.118 244.9 0.0262  0:0262 261.54
0.15 0.864 0.118 244.9 0.0308  0:0262 261.54
0.99 0.463 0.092 500.6 0.2167  0:0005 5.87
0.50 0.00 0.781 0.193 446.9 0.0687  0:0433 267.74
0.15 0.758 0.160 643.0 0.0678  0:0104 71.67
0.99 0.439 0.151 711.0 0.1763  0:0005 3.64
0.75 0.00 0.712 0.229 695.5 0.0950  0:0358 182.73
0.15 0.685 0.195 870.8 0.0897  0:0013 7.48
0.99 0.434 0.194 875.4 0.1374  0:0005 2.87
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Table 7: Optimal Dividend Policy without Strategic Debt service
This table describes the dierence in debt and equity values (V
D
and V
E
, respectively) and spreads
of debt yields over the risk-free rate under optimal dividend policies for the binomial cash ow model
when debt service is strategic and non-strategic. The parameter combinations are the same as in
Table 3. The volatility  is held xed at 
2
= 0:10, and the payout ratio b is xed at b = 0:025.
The remaining parameters are as described in the table. c is the face-value of zero-coupon debt, m
0
and m
1
are the xed and proportional costs of raising new equity, respectively, and l
0
and l
1
are the
xed and proportional costs of liquidation, respectively. m
0
is taken to be zero.
l
0
= 0:0; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.862 0.132 123.7 0.0057  0:0006 4.61
0.15 0.861 0.132 123.7 0.0028  0:0002 1.75
0.99 0.861 0.137 93.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.00
0.50 0.00 0.761 0.226 284.2 0.0247  0:0122 57.17
0.15 0.760 0.221 308.2 0.0090  0:0010 4.67
0.99 0.754 0.219 316.1 0.0028  0:0000 0.06
0.75 0.00 0.692 0.283 473.6 0.0404  0:0148 56.51
0.15 0.688 0.276 500.1 0.0173  0:0015 5.69
0.99 0.664 0.272 515.4 0.0110  0:0000 0.07
l
0
= 0:1; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.869 0.121 217.0 0.0197  0:0098 86.79
0.15 0.868 0.121 217.0 0.0166  0:0098 86.79
0.99 0.868 0.129 149.7 0.0006  0:0006 4.97
0.50 0.00 0.768 0.206 382.9 0.0491  0:0228 122.73
0.15 0.767 0.196 432.9 0.0381  0:0131 72.37
0.99 0.761 0.193 449.7 0.0012  0:0002 0.95
0.75 0.00 0.699 0.252 595.6 0.0746  0:0248 110.31
0.15 0.695 0.240 646.2 0.0569  0:0131 59.71
0.99 0.671 0.233 675.9 0.0076  0:0002 0.87
l
0
= 0:2; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.882 0.118 244.9 0.0262  0:0262 261.54
0.15 0.881 0.118 244.9 0.0222  0:0262 261.54
0.99 0.880 0.110 311.2 0.0052 0.0044  40:45
0.50 0.00 0.791 0.199 415.5 0.0589  0:0493 299.15
0.15 0.788 0.199 415.5 0.0500  0:0441 262.98
0.99 0.778 0.184 499.3 0.0046 0.0058  32:33
0.75 0.00 0.715 0.240 647.4 0.0915  0:0464 230.89
0.15 0.712 0.223 722.9 0.0792  0:0296 153.11
0.99 0.688 0.214 769.7 0.0081 0.0058  28:55
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Table 8: Modied Merton model and its comparison with Optimal Dividend Policy
This table describes debt and equity values (V
D
and V
E
, respectively) and spreads of debt yields
over the risk-free rate under the modied-Merton model; and the dierences betweeen these numbers
and the corresponding ones in the optimal dividends model (Table 3). The parameter values are
the same as in Table 3. Two parameters in the table are held xed: the volatility  at 
2
= 0:10,
and the payout ratio b at b = 0:025. The remaining paremeters are as described in the table. c is
the face-value of zero-coupon debt, m
0
and m
1
are the xed and proportional costs of raising new
equity, respectively, and l
0
and l
1
are the xed and proportional costs of liquidation, respectively.
m
0
is taken to be zero.
l
0
= 0:0; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.851 0.149 1.90 0.0177  0:0177 126.43
0.15 0.850 0.149 1.90 0.0132  0:0173 123.57
0.99 0.850 0.149 1.90 0.0107  0:0130 91.12
0.50 0.00 0.715 0.285 51.7 0.0704  0:0704 289.62
0.15 0.713 0.285 51.7 0.0561  0:0644 261.20
0.99 0.682 0.285 51.7 0.0745  0:0651 264.48
0.75 0.00 0.612 0.388 148.8 0.1197  0:1197 381.37
0.15 0.604 0.388 148.8 0.1009  0:1135 357.04
0.99 0.523 0.388 148.8 0.1525  0:1160 366.69
l
0
= 0:1; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.853 0.147 18.8 0.0360  0:0360 284.98
0.15 0.853 0.147 18.8 0.0314  0:0360 284.98
0.99 0.853 0.147 18.8 0.0152  0:0185 135.83
0.50 0.00 0.730 0.270 106.0 0.0868  0:0868 399.62
0.15 0.729 0.270 106.0 0.0761  0:0867 399.27
0.99 0.697 0.270 106.0 0.0651  0:0769 344.64
0.75 0.00 0.639 0.361 222.2 0.1337  0:1337 483.73
0.15 0.634 0.361 222.2 0.1174  0:1337 483.73
0.99 0.543 0.361 222.2 0.1361  0:1275 454.60
l
0
= 0:2; l
1
= 0:25
c m
1
V
E
V
D
Spread (bps) Di. in V
E
Di. in V
D
Di. in Spread (bps)
0.25 0.00 0.860 0.140 66.8 0.0488  0:0488 439.68
0.15 0.860 0.140 66.8 0.0433  0:0488 439.68
0.99 0.860 0.140 66.8 0.0255  0:0255 204.01
0.50 0.00 0.750 0.250 183.6 0.0997  0:0997 531.04
0.15 0.750 0.250 183.6 0.0882  0:0945 494.87
0.99 0.726 0.250 183.6 0.0558  0:0600 283.41
0.75 0.00 0.670 0.330 312.6 0.1369  0:1369 565.67
0.15 0.667 0.330 312.6 0.1241  0:1365 563.47
0.99 0.577 0.330 312.6 0.1186  0:1107 428.61
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Table 9: Impact of Strategic Dividend Policy on Valuations
This table describes equilibrium valuations of equity and debt for the model of Appendix C
under two the residual dividend and optimal dividend regimes. The table also describes
equilibrium spreads (over the default-free rate) under the two models. Three values are
used for the default-free interest rate . The remaining parameter values are as stated in
the Example. The terms V
D
and V
E
refer, respectively, to the values of debt and equity in
equilibrium.
 = 0:000
Model V
D
V
E
Spread (in bps)
Residual Dividends 102.00 21.00 66
Optimal Dividends 93.00 30.00 385
 = 0:005
Model V
D
V
E
Spread (in bps)
Residual Dividends 101.49 19.71 83
Optimal Dividends 91.64 29.56 387
 = 0:010
Model V
D
V
E
Spread (in bps)
Residual Dividends 100.99 18.45 0
Optimal Dividends 90.28 29.16 389
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